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I. INTRODUCTION
The drones are coming!
Consumers’ having the ability to order goods online and then hav-
ing the goods delivered to their doorsteps has become a staple in mod-
ern America. Quick delivery within 2–5 days is available for
thousands of small goods.1 Internet shopping even has its own special
day just after Thanksgiving, colloquially “Cyber Monday,” that shows
† J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, Spring 2016; B.A., Co-
lumbia College, 2013.
1. Amazon Prime Shipping Benefits, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201118070 (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
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increasing revenues every year.2 Some companies, Amazon in particu-
lar, are planning to go a step further with near instantaneous (i.e.
within thirty minutes) delivery of small items in most major metropo-
lises in the United States.3 The magic behind the method comes in the
form of drones, which are pilotless machines capable of flight.4 These
small, airborne devices stand to revolutionize business, not just in in-
dustries related to deliveries, but across all spectrums, from farms to
Amazon and many in between.5 The major obstacle to their immedi-
ate use, however, is the Federal Aviation Administration’s airspace
use rules that govern small pilotless craft as they lift off and enter the
national airspace while under hire or for compensation.6
The term “drone” is commonly included when discussing wars
abroad in the post-9/11 era; the term was used by President George
W. Bush and President Barack Obama when these vehicles conducted
precision strikes on terrorist threats.7 These craft, known alternatively
as Remote Piloted Vehicles,8 have strengthened the national intelli-
gence apparatus and added powerful tools to the Department of De-
fense’s toolbox when fighting a vague and shifty enemy.9 However,
their applications are no longer strictly limited to military use.10 These
unmanned aerial vehicles, referred to by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (“FAA”) as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (“UAS”), a
term that includes the related control equipment,11 are now finding
their way to the doorsteps of American citizens as the newest tool in
commerce.12 As the truism goes, the law often lags behind the tech-
nology it seeks to regulate.13
2. Trevor Mogg, Cyber Monday: Online Shoppers Set Single-Day Spending Re-
cord, DIGITALTRENDS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/cyber-mon
day-online-shoppers-set-single-day-spending-record/.
3. Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8037720011
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
4. See id.
5. Civil and Commercial UAS Applications, UAVS, https://www.uavs.org/com
mercial (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
6. Pax Dickinson, Entrepreneurs at SXSW: Give Us Our Drones!, BUSINESSIN-
SIDER (Mar. 19, 2013, 11:56AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/faa-ban-on-commer
cial-drones-2013-3.
7. Derek Gregory, From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War, 28 THE-
ORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY 189, 189–90 (2011).
8. LAWRENCE NEWCOME, UNMANNED AVIATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF UN-
MANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 1 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Thor Benson, Important Al-Qaida Member Umar Farooq Believed
Dead After Drone Strike in Pakistan, UPI (Dec. 7, 2014, 5:23 PM), http://www.upi
.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/12/07/Important-al-Qaida-member-Umar-Farooq-
believed-dead-after-drone-strike-in-Pakistan/2821417987264.
10. See NEWCOME, supra note 8, at 127.
11. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions, FED. AVIA-
TION. ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/faq (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
12. See, e.g., Amazon Prime Air, supra note 3.
13. Lyria Bennet Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239 (2007).
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Domestic drone use falls by virtue of FAA regulation into three
somewhat distinct groups. The first, governmental or public use, re-
lates mostly to police action and other governmental needs.14 Second
are personal UAS for recreational uses, which generally fall into a
“model aircraft” category.15 Some  personal-use UAS are priced be-
low $50 and allow the operator to fly the vehicles as toys inside their
homes, or under limited circumstances, outside.16 Third is civil use,
which includes commercial applications where the UAS are employed
for compensation to perform services, such as deliveries or video re-
cordings.17 This third category is the subject of this Comment.
The circumstances under which commercial UAS operate in the Na-
tional Airspace System (“NAS”) has been a highly debated topic as it
relates to their regulation and use. Commercial UAS are currently
without direct rules or regulations comparable to those governing
other vehicles in the NAS, such as private airplanes, commercial air-
liners, ultralight gliders, or even hot air balloons.18 This gap in the law
has created a colloquial “gray area” under which commercial drone
operators must operate, though the FAA firmly denies any gap.19 The
FAA has historically relied on voluntary policy-guidance memoranda
as binding law for the general public;20 however, issues with this reli-
ance arose in 2014.
Recent administrative decisions by the National Transportation
Safety Board have further cluttered the regulatory airspace in which
UAS operate. The debate recently shifted around whether a UAS is
even an “aircraft” under Title 14 of the C.F.R., subjecting violators to
civil penalties for “unsafe operation” with fines upwards of $10,000.21
However, Congress has mandated that the FAA create separate oper-
ating rules for UAS by September 2015.22
This Comment aims to show that current regulation, or more pre-
cisely non-regulation of commercial UAS should be modified, and op-
erators should be allowed to conduct commercial operations without
14. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PUBLIC OPERATIONS (GOVERNMENTAL) (2015),
http://www.faa.gov/uas/public_operations/.
15. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (2015), http://www
.faa.gov/uas/model_aircraft/.
16. See, e.g., Hubsan X4 Mini Quadcopter, RADIOSHACK, http://www.radioshack
.com/hubsan-x4-mini-quadcopter-black-red/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
17. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CIVIL OPERATIONS (NON-GOVERNMENTAL) (2015),
http://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_operations/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
18. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.1, 25.1, 31.1 (2015).
19. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., BUSTING MYTHS ABOUT THE FAA AND UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT, Myth #3, http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240 (last modified
Mar. 7, 2014).
20. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AC NO. 91-57A, MODEL
AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS (2015).
21. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2015); Pirker Decisional Order, Docket CP-217, Attach-
ment 1 (NTSB Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf
[hereinafter Pirker].
22. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3).
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subjecting UAS to the high standards of other “aircraft.” Per Con-
gress’s mandate, the FAA should immediately create and enforce
practically sound standards for small-scale, commercial UAS that op-
erate inside the NAS while avoiding unnecessary and costly adminis-
trative burdens.23 Congress should modify the currently voluntary
standards, instead of mandating that operators adhere to specific com-
mercial use guidelines without requiring an arduous approval process
for commercial flight, such as the current Special Airworthiness Cer-
tificate and Section 333 exemption.24 This Comment will not address
the issues facing larger, interstate drones that will operate outside of
the visual sight or immediate area of the operator.
II. THE HISTORY OF UAS AND THEIR COMMERCIALIZATION
IN MODERN AMERICA
The evolution of drone use comes from a rich military history be-
ginning just before the First World War, just as manned aviation took
flight.25 With the birth of civil aviation in the early 20th century, a
market for military applications soon followed.26 Inventors sought a
way for these new aerial vehicles to operate unmanned and possibly
unpiloted, from takeoff to landing.27 Such operations required the cre-
ation of three critical technologies: automatic aircraft stabilization, re-
mote control, and autonomous navigation.28 Elmer Sperry was the
first to attempt integration of these technologies together onboard a
flying machine.29 Acceptance and implementation was less than im-
mediate, however, after several early crashes occurred while operating
an Army test platform aircraft.30 The aircraft was designed solely for
straight and level flight without the aid of a pilot, but did not perform
as intended.31 The Navy also distanced itself from the poor results,
stating that such technology could never substitute for the experience
of an actual pilot.32
As war broke out in 1914, governments looked to advanced arma-
ment design.33 Twenty years prior, Nikola Tesla, the father of modern
electrical design, conceived of a pilotless flying bomb, an idea he con-
veyed to fellow inventor Peter Hewitt.34 Hewitt later associated pro-
23. Id. at § 332(a)(1).
24. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CIVIL OPERATIONS (NON-GOVERNMENTAL) (2015),
http://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_operations/.
25. See NEWCOME, supra note 8, at 1–4.
26. See id. at 15–16.
27. See id. at 20–21.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 16.
31. NEWCOME, supra note 8, at 16.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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fessionally with Sperry, and  their combined work created  the design
for the aerial torpedo, a major precursor to all modern unmanned ae-
rial craft.35 In 1916 and 1917, there were many successful, albeit im-
perfect, demonstrations of an automated piloting system shown to the
United States Government, which subsequently poured many more
dollars into the research.36 From this funding came the highly success-
ful demonstration and integration of a pilotless remote control system
in 1924 by the Naval Research Laboratory.37 Each subsequent war
saw great advances in the use of the unmanned aerial vehicles
(“UAS”); variations of weaponized or patrol UAS appeared in World
War II,38 Vietnam,39 and the First Gulf War.40
Moving forward to the 21st century, the United States government
in 2003 spent over $1 billion on unmanned aircraft for the department
of defense alone, a number that continues to grow in excess of $3 bil-
lion per year.41 By the end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/
11, UAS had evolved into a staple of the military reconnaissance and
strike strategies.42 In addition, as war advances tend to do, these new
technologies found themselves also seeping into American commer-
cial concepts.43
The viability of using commercial UAS increased when model air-
craft were modified with cameras and other capabilities.44 From this
evolved multiple niche markets for the application of drone technolo-
gies. Their uses included agricultural spraying, photography, delivery
services, industrial inspection, and ground mapping.45
The most high-visibility example of commercial drone use came
when Amazon announced its plans to implement Amazon Prime Air,
an extension of their popular quick-delivery program, Amazon
Prime.46 A demonstrative video on the Amazon website shows that
this future delivery method will allow a user to select a good online
(presumably limiting this selection to smaller items), and then select a
thirty-minute Prime delivery option upon checkout.47 The merchan-
35. See id. at 16–18.
36. See id. at 18–21.
37. NEWCOME, supra note 8, at 38.
38. Id. at 49.
39. Id. at 83–91.
40. Id. at 97.
41. JEREMY GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED AE-
RIAL SYSTEMS 14, Figure 2 (2012).
42. Id. at 1.
43. See, e.g., Amazon Prime Air, supra note 3.
44. See, e.g., Phantom Drones, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom (last vis-
ited Sept. 9, 2015).
45. Joseph Dussault, 7 Commercial Uses for Drones, BOSTON (Mar. 14, 2014, 4:01
PM), http://www.boston.com/business/2014/03/14/commercial-uses-for-drones/dscS47
PsQdPneIB2UQeY0M/story.html.
46. See, e.g., Amazon Prime Air, supra note 3.
47. Id.
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dise will then be packaged in a small plastic box, transported down a
conveyer belt, and attached to an awaiting rotary drone.48 The drone
then will take to the skies and fly to the customer location with a
sound similar to a mosquito. Upon arrival it will make a precise land-
ing, deposit the small box on the consumer’s property, and fly back to
the Amazon shipping facility.49
Projections for the future of commercial UAS in America show a
major upward trend. Some sources project expenditures of over $91
billion over the next decade for commercial UAS alone.50 Commenta-
tors have projected uses far beyond the typical photography and deliv-
ery roles.51 These commentators see the possibility of providing
Internet service to remote geographical areas; tracking and docu-
menting animal growth patterns; and even conducting full-scale un-
manned search and rescue missions.52  In 2002, with approximately
2,400 unmanned vehicles in use around the world, Japan used nearly
65% of its UAS for agricultural purposes tending to 10% of their rice
crops.53 One estimate even suggests that one drone may have replaced
the efforts of fifteen farmers in these fields.54
Since 2002 major technological advances have developed. These ad-
vances have further allowed expanded drone use. As remote control
interfaces are updated UAS can be controlled from longer distances
or may require no control inputs from an operator at all once it leaves
the ground. Energy technology advances will also allow for longer
flights, depending on use, and may even permit a five-year flight time
for monitoring weather or acting as a navigational aid.
III. THE NAS, THE FAA’S BAN, AND CURRENT REGULATIONS
A. Brief Explanation of the National Airspace System
The NAS is a highly complex system of extensively trained person-
nel, including controllers, technicians, and equipment that control all
airspace over the United States.55 The NAS evolved from dangerous
cross-country trips without assistance into a series of complex airways
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $91 Billion in Its 2014
UAV Market Profile and Forecast, TEAL GROUP (July 17, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://
www.tealgroup.com/index.php/about-teal-group-corporation/press-releases/118-2014-
uav-press-release.
51. Dussault, supra note 45.
52. Id.
53. NEWCOME, supra note 8, at 127.
54. Id.
55. See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PILOT’S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTI-
CAL KNOWLEDGE, 14-2–14-3 (2008), http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/hand
books_manuals/aviation/pilot_handbook/media/FAA-H-8083-25A.pdf (better known
as “PHAK”) [hereinafter PHAK].
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at multiple altitudes managed by controllers who have a real-time
view of aircraft traffic.56
The NAS is most well-known for its classes of airspace, which range
from A to G, with F omitted.57 Class B is generally the busiest, usually
around the nation’s busiest airports and often “resemble upside-down
wedding cakes” stacked in layers that expand in size with altitude.58
UAS operation of any kind within Class B airspace is prohibited; in
fact, only certain types of aircraft are permitted in this class due to the
higher possibility of an incident with a commercial airliner.59 Class G
is uncontrolled by Air Traffic Control, relying solely on Visual Flight
Rules as a means to keep aircraft safe in these areas.60
The airspaces are currently controlled by a legacy air traffic control
system, based on ground-based navigation aids and controller instruc-
tions.61 However, under guidance of Congress, the FAA implemented
NextGen, a more flexible system that aims to transition air traffic con-
trol to a satellite-based system.62 This upgrade does not currently in-
clude provisions for UAS integration within the system and will likely
present an issue in the future as long-distance UAS regulations are
enacted.63
B. Small UAS FAA Regulations, Memoranda, and Circulars
The applicability of current regulations to commercial drone use in
the NAS is not entirely clear. Current federal regulations do not ex-
plicitly identify the requirements with which commercial drone opera-
tors must comply and Title 14 of the C.F.R., relating to Aeronautics
and Space, does not mention unmanned aircraft systems or similar
terms.64 The FAA has instead relied on internal memoranda and cir-
culars issued over a nearly thirty-year period as per se regulation of
UAS in American airspace.
56. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A Brief History of the FAA, https://www.faa.gov/
about/history/brief_history/.
57. PHAK, supra note 55.
58. Id. at 14-2.
59. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FACT SHEET-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (Jan.
26, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153 (“UAS
operations are currently not authorized in Class B airspace”).
60. PHAK, supra note 55, at 14-3.
61. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIR TRAFFIC NEXTGEN BRIEFING, http://
www.faa.gov/air_traffic/briefing/ (last modified Sept. 18, 2014, 9:36:14 AM).
62. Id.
63. Adam Clark Estes, FAA’s New $5 Billion Air Traffic Control System Forgot
About Drones, GIZMODO (Sept. 26, 2014, 10:11 AM), http://gizmodo.com/faas-fancy-
new-5-billion-air-traffic-control-system-fo-1639463748.
64. See generally 14 C.F.R. pts. 1–199 (2015).
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The Sections of Title 14 C.F.R. relating to aviation regulations are
Federal Aviation Regulations, or FARs, its former official title.65 The
various sections are referred to as “parts,” each part encompassing a
certain aspect of aviation regulation.66 For example, C.F.R. Section
91.13, Subsection (a) of Title 14, relating to civil liability for reckless
operation of an aircraft, is more commonly referred to as a rule under
FAR Part 91.67
In FAA Policy Notice 07-01, issued in 2007, the FAA outlined its
historical and current policies regarding UAS use in United States air-
space.68 The notice covers the authority under which unmanned sys-
tems may fly under the three categories: public, civil, and
recreational.69
Public UAS fly under special provisions or waivers.70 The FAA may
issue a Certificate of Authorization or Waiver for uses including law
enforcement, firefighting, border patrol, disaster relief, search and res-
cue, and other governmental missions.71 The Authorization-Waiver
application is submitted online and will typically receive a response
within sixty days, allowing certain airspace use for a period of approxi-
mately two years.72 As a condition of use, some UAS may require
transponders that show altitude, direction, and speed to controllers if
they enter certain airspace.73 There may also be a “chase-plane” re-
quirement in some situations.74
For civil use, the notice dictates that operators obtain an experimen-
tal certificate, without a specific reference to the FAA policy requiring
such a certification.75 If the certificate is granted, the operator may not
use the UAS for commercial means; specifically, they may not carry
people or property for compensation or hire.76 But they may conduct
research.77
65. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRPLANE FLYING HANDBOOK, 1–1 (2004), https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aircraft/airplane_handbook/
media/FAA-H-8083-3B.pdf.
66. See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FAR/AIM
2015: FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS/AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL
(2015).
67. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA REGULATIONS, https://www.faa.gov/regula-
tions_policies/faa_regulations/ (last modified June 30, 2014, 7:25 PM); see also 14
C.F.R. § 91.13 (2015).
68. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg.
6689 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
69. Id.
70. PUBLIC OPERATIONS, supra note 14.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 68, at 6689.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 6690.
76. Id.
77. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR306.txt unknown Seq: 9  4-DEC-15 10:46
2015] DRONE NATION 519
The authority for recreational operators of model aircraft is found
in a 1987 advisory circular, AC  91-57, which offered voluntary safety
rules for model aircraft that are often cited as current binding regula-
tion for commercial UAS.78 The circular offered several suggestions
for modelers in the interest of public safety.79 The suggestions include:
staying away from populated or noise sensitive areas; avoiding specta-
tors until a model aircraft is proven airworthy; keeping the model air-
craft at or below 400 feet and notifying air traffic control when flying
within three miles of an airport; and always giving right-of-way to full-
scale aircraft.80 The FAA also created a brief website summarizing the
contents of the Policy Statement that addresses the use of UAS in the
NAS.81 The FAA’s website specifically states that it prohibits civil
non-recreational operations of unmanned aircraft systems for hire be-
cause they require an experimental designation, which does not per-
mit commercial uses.82
The Pirker decisions from the National Transportation Safety Board
(“NTSB”) demonstrate how the enforceability of these provisions as a
matter of law is unclear. The case, first heard before a single adminis-
trative judge and later before an en banc administrative appeal, ad-
dresses whether commercial UAS are subject to experimental
certificates, qualify as model aircraft, or even have a legal duty to op-
erate in a non-reckless manner.83
In 2012, Congress granted a small exception to the FAA’s effective
commercial drone ban.84 Section 333 of the FAA Reform and Mod-
ernization Act of 2012 (“FAARMA”) granted the FAA authority to
bridge the gap between the current lack of drone regulations and com-
mercial drone use in the United States.85 The FAA administrator may
issue exemptions to drone operators based on size, weight, speed, op-
erational capability  and proximity to airports and populated areas.
The administrator also considers whether  operation within line-of-
sight creates a hazard to the public or users of the NAS, and whether
this operation poses a threat to national security.86 As of March 17,
2015, the current approved exemption list includes  48 companies,
78. MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS, supra note 20.
79. See id. at 1–2.
80. Id. at 2–3.
81. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (2015), http://
www.faa.gov/uas/model_aircraft/ (a separate and distinct online source from AC 91-
57, supra note 20).
82. Id.
83. See Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Pirker, No. EA-6730, 2004 WL 8095629 (Nov. 18,
2014).
84. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333(b).
85. Id.
86. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., SECTION 333, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_pro
grams/section_333/ (last modified Aug. 21, 2015, 2:22 PM).
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while approximately 766 petitions await public comment and ap-
proval.87 This process appears to be very slow in nature.
The FAA has issued an interpretation regarding Section 336 of the
FAARMA.88 This interpretation, to be discussed in depth later in the
Comment, was issued as a response to the first of two Pirker v. Ad-
ministrator decisions.
IV. COMMERCIAL UAS AND FAA INTERVENTION
A. Early Occurrences
As higher volumes of unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS”) enter na-
tional airspace, many are finding themselves on the wrong end of the
FAA’s unclear regulations. The FAA’s primary method for asserting
their authority over commercial drone operators is through cease-and-
desist letters.89 The letters reference the requirements created in FAA
Policy Notice 07-01, which include experimental certificates for civil
use and mandatory provisions for UAS use in the NAS.90 The content
of the letters  shows that regional FAA drone safety inspectors scan
the internet and local articles, and receive input through the complaint
process  to find instances of commercial drone use, regardless of any
harm caused, and issue the cease-and-desist letters.91
A headline example of the process arose when the FAA grounded
Lakemaid Beer’s drone delivery service.92 The delivery service was
offered by a local brewery based in Stevens Point, Wisconsin.93 The
business, which coins its product as the “fisherman’s lager,” had plans
to deliver cases of its beer to ice-fisherman across frozen lakes via
drones.94 Many northern lakes have combined bait-beer shops on the
shore, similar to Lakemaid, which would be the base of operations for
the beer drone.95 Lakemaid’s managing partner, Jack Supple, sought
to stay below the 400-foot limit suggested by Advisory Circular 91-57
87. Id.
88. See FAA Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg.
36172 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91), http://02b954f
.netsolhost.com/docs/Interpretation_extension_of_comment_period_071714.pdf.
89. Matthew Shroyer, FAA Cease and Desist Letters Show Agency’s Attempts to
Control Drone Use in the US, ROBOHUB, http://robohub.org/faa-cease-and-desist-let
ters-show-agencys-attempts-to-control-drone-use-in-the-us/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. John Biggs, The FAA Shuts Down Beer-Delivery Drone, TECHCRUNCH, http://
techcrunch.com/2014/02/04/the-faa-shuts-down-beer-delivery-drone/ (last visited Sept.
7, 2015).
93. Id.
94. LakemaidSpotter, Lakemaid Beer Drone Delivery, YOUTUBE (Jan. 24, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmHwXf8JUOw.
95. Id.
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and thought the operations seemed far less dangerous than Amazon’s
longer-ranged plans.96
The FAA disagreed with Lakemaid’s plans and called the company
to inform it of its violation of FAA rules.97 The FAA alleged that
Lakemaid broke four or five regulations including the operators’ fail-
ure to earn a proper rating and improper use of airspace.98 As a mat-
ter of definition, this implies that the UAS were not operating as
model aircraft, because they were for commercial use; therefore, per
the FAA’s interpretation, the UAS was operating civilly and  required
an experimental certificate, which is not issued to commercial opera-
tions.99 Therefore, Lakemaid, like other commercial attempts, falls
into a black hole from which commercial UAS may not currently es-
cape without administrator approval.
B. Pirker
The ambiguity of FAA regulatory authority over UAS came to a
climax in a series of administrative decisions—known collectively as
the Pirker Orders—where a commercial drone operator found himself
accused of violating rules that had not previously been recognized as
applicable to commercial UAS.100 The ruling on appeal further recog-
nized UAS, regardless of commercial or non-commercial use, as “air-
craft.” The ruling, therefore subjects UAS to civil liability for
operations and subjects the drone aircraft and operators to the possi-
bility of extensive regulatory requirements.101
The case arose when Raphael Pirker was offering commercial drone
services around the University of Virginia campus in Charlottesville,
Virginia.102 Pirker used his Zephyr II drone—with an attached high
definition camera—to take aerial photography for clientele including
Lewis Communications.103
According to the Order, Pirker controlled the drone during com-
mercial operations into several areas, including: into a tunnel used by
cars; within 100 feet of an active heliport near a person on a sidewalk
(causing the person to move to avoid being struck); near a crane; near
a train track; and, generally, throughout the campus between altitudes
of 10 feet and 1500 feet. Pirker did not account for possible nearby
96. Bill Chappel, Beer Drone Can Buzz the Skies No More, FAA Says, NPR (Jan.
30, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/01/30/269039542/beer-drone-
can-buzz-the-skies-no-more-faa-says.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. FAA Interpretation, supra note 88, at 10.
100. Pirker, supra note 21.
101. See Pirker Opinion and Order, Order No. EA-5730 (NTSB Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf [hereinafter Pirker Opinion].
102. Pirker, supra note 21.
103. Id.
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aircraft.104 In the initial order of assessment, the FAA Administrator
alleged that these actions constituted a violation of 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13(a) for careless or reckless operation of an unmanned air-
craft.105 In accordance with the C.F.R., Pirker was assessed a $10,000
civil penalty.106
Pirker appealed the FAA’s Order of Assessment to Judge Patrick
Geraghty, an administrative law judge with the NTSB.107 Judge Pat-
rick Geraghty ruled for Pirker, dismissing the FAA’s complaint as a
matter of law, setting aside the $10,000 penalty, and ruling that the
UAS did not qualify as an aircraft.108 However, Judge Geraghty’s
opinion was not limited solely as to the legality of the FAA’s imposing
a penalty on Pirker; the opinion contained a list of findings having
much larger implications for FAA commercial drone policy in the
NAS.109
Judge Geraghty’s opinion included five findings.110 First, the term
“aircraft” as defined by the FARs and 49 U.S.C. Section 40102(a)(6)
could include model aircraft.111 Second, the model aircraft used by
Pirker, although the incident was under hire for commercial photogra-
phy operations, was only subject to Advisory Circular 91-57’s volun-
tary safety guidelines.112 The footnote for this finding noted that
allowing the FAA to consider any object capable of flight as an “air-
craft” per either section would result in reductio ad absurdium; more
precisely, it would allow for an absurd result that paper airplanes or
children’s toys could be subject to the FAA’s regulation and pen-
alty.113 Third, FAA Policy Notice 08-01 and its predecessor 05-01 were
issued as internal guidance and therefore do not present a jurisdic-
tional basis for asserting the Part 91 FAR penalty.114 Fourth, FAA
Policy Notice 07-01 also does not grant jurisdictional authority be-
cause it either (a) is internal guidance similar to 08-01 and 05-01 and
non-binding on the public, or (b) is not a proper attempt to make
legislation as it violated specific rulemaking authority.115 Fifth, be-
cause there was no valid FAA rule or FAR regulation applicable to
Pirker’s air vehicle as a model aircraft or UAS when he operated his
drone for commercial operations, he could not be liable for the
$10,000 penalty.116
104. Id.
105. Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 61.121 (2015).
106. Pirker, supra note 21
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. at 7–8.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Pirker, supra note 21, at 7.
113. Id. at 7 n.24.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id.
116. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR306.txt unknown Seq: 13  4-DEC-15 10:46
2015] DRONE NATION 523
On appeal, the board of three judges partially reversed Judge Ger-
gaghty’s ruling.117 The appeal addressed two issues: (1) whether the
model aircraft used by Pirker was an aircraft under either 49 U.S.C.
§ 40102(a)(6) or 14 C.F.R. § 1.1, and (2) whether the model aircraft,
as an aircraft under either legislative definition, subjected Pirker to
penalty under Section 91.13 C.F.R.118 The panel first applied a plain-
language analysis to the definition of aircraft, finding that model air-
craft are not an independent category of aircraft, but instead are a
subset.119 Further, model aircraft, such as Pirker’s Zephyr or any
other object that flies, are aircraft under the FARs, subject to Part 91
regulations relating to safe operation.120 The panel did not determine
whether Pirker had actually violated Part 91, but instead the panel
remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.121
In between the administrative law judge decisions, the FAA
stepped in with an interpretation of FAARMA, which falls into line
with the latest Pirker decision, specifically addressing Section 336 re-
garding their ability to regulate model aircraft.122 First, they recog-
nized that all UAS are aircraft, but only some are model aircraft,
depending on the usage of the aircraft at the time.123 The FAARMA
specifically prohibited the FAA from further regulating aircraft classi-
fied as model aircraft.124 However, this interpretation delineated that
commercially operated UAS were, in fact, not model aircraft when
not flown for hobby or recreational purposes.125 The interpretation
covered several other provisions that a model aircraft must meet in
order to actually qualify as such and become exempt from FAA
regulations.126
V. POST-PIRKER
Out of the muddled rulings and regulations over UAS, few things
are clear. However, in the wake of the Pirker decisions, commercial
operators should be aware of several likely implications.
A. There are no explicit binding regulations specifically
for commercial UAS.
When Judge Geraghty listed his findings, it was a damning moment
for the FAA’s marginal attempt to regulate drone entry into the UAS.
117. Pirker Opinion, supra note 101, at 12.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 5–7.
120. Id. at 8–11.
121. Id. at 12.
122. FAA Interpretation, supra note 88, at 1.
123. See id. at 11.
124. Id. at 6–7.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 11.
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Geraghty specifically ruled that neither AC 91-57 nor any of the inter-
nal policy memoranda were binding authority on the general public.127
Each of the publications was deficient in one or more ways, and,
therefore, not law.128 The original model aircraft advisory circular spe-
cifically includes that the standards are voluntary safety standards,
and not mandatory.129 The standards have been voluntary since their
initial publication in 1981, and there have been no changes by the
FAA. However, although not mandatory, the standards are strongly
encouraged for model aircraft operators as a proper standard of care
when operating their devices in the NAS. Commercial UAS previ-
ously did not qualify under this standard. The Comment addresses this
point in the subsequent section.
On appeal, the panel of judges only addressed the sections of Judge
Geraghty’s opinion relating to UAS as aircraft under the FARs or the
USC, and  the aircraft’s liability for acting in a reckless or careless
manner.130 The panel left the explicit findings related to the FAA’s
lack of jurisdiction undisturbed. Therefore, the lack of jurisdiction is
likely still binding law or dicta on the current regulatory reality.
In addition, with the FAA interpretation, the focus was on whether
a UAS could be considered a model aircraft under the FAARMA.
What the interpretation did not cover was what kind of regulations
non-recreational commercial UAS fall under. Are they to be consid-
ered civil aircraft? Do they fall into a gray area where no regulations
exist at all? Alternatively, is there a chance they are somehow still
model aircraft?
B. Commercial UAS May or May Not Currently Qualify
as Model Aircraft
Unmanned aircraft systems, regardless of commercial or non-com-
mercial use, may still currently qualify as model aircraft. Both Pirker
opinions refer to Pirker’s Zephyr II drone, even while under hire for
commercial use to photograph the University of Virginia campus, as a
model aircraft.131 The appellate panel specifically determined that
Pirker’s drone was an aircraft, as used in Part 91, by finding that
model aircraft such as Pirker’s were a subset of aircraft, and are there-
fore included in the meaning.132 The latest Pirker decision also came
after the FAA’s interpretation, potentially overruling the regulation,
albeit possibly inadvertently.133
127. Pirker, supra note 21, at 4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Pirker Opinion, supra note 101, at 4.
131. Id. at 11.
132. Id. at 10–11.
133. Id. at 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR306.txt unknown Seq: 15  4-DEC-15 10:46
2015] DRONE NATION 525
C. Commercial UAS may be subject to civil aircraft
FARs as “aircraft.”
Although the authorities historically used to govern the operation
of UASs in the United States were struck down, the panel of adminis-
trative law judges on appeal defined all UAS as aircraft.134 This poten-
tially, as a matter of default if they are no longer model aircraft,
subjects UAS to the set of regulations for civil aircraft, which are the
basis for current commercial aircraft operations.
For example, C.F.R. Section 91.7 of Title 14 requires that civil air-
craft be maintained in an airworthy condition.135 To that end, civil air-
craft must maintain an “airworthiness certificate.”136 The FAA
requires that in order to keep this certificate, owners must meet an
approved design, keep the aircraft in a condition for safe operation,
and meet stringent maintenance and preventative maintenance stan-
dards in accordance with multiple sections of Title 14 of the C.F.R.s.
Among other factors, such as make and model, the FAA considers
completeness of maintenance records and overall condition of the air-
craft to determine if the aircraft is in a safe operating condition. Air-
craft also have several technical system requirements such as anti-
collision lights, airspeed and altitude instruments, and a magnetic di-
rection indicator.
Another set of staunch requirements for civil aircraft flying in the
United States are the requirements for pilots. Part 61.3 of 14 C.F.R.
requires that any person operating a civil aircraft in the United States
follow strict rules, including obtaining a pilot certificate through an
intensive training syllabus and  a medical exam evaluating the pilot’s
ability to operate an  aircraft.137 Student pilots as well as balloon and
glider operators are exempt from the medical evaluation
requirement.138
Further, because the UAS are operating commercially, they may
also be subject to the commercial-rating requirements. These rating
requirements set specific limits for those who operate aircraft for
hire.139 To obtain this rating, pilots must already possess the private
pilot certificate and complete training that is even more rigorous.140
One company estimates the upgrade cost at $8,000; this is in addition
to the $8,000 cost for the private pilot license.141 Such requirements
are extremely involved and costly for any person, possibly even more
134. Id. at 12.
135. 14 C.F.R. § 91.7 (2015).
136. Id. § 91.203.
137. Id. § 61.3.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 61.133.
140. Id.
141. Commercial Pilot Pricing, TNG AVIATION, http://www.touch-n-goes.com/com-
mercial/commercialpilotpricing.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
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for a drone operator who may have spent less than a $1,000 for a craft
capable of only relatively simple aviation tasks.
VI. GOING FORWARD
The FAA did allow for exemptions from the current regulations for
drone experimentation; a path Amazon is currently pursuing so that it
may continue its commercial pursuits within the United States without
fear of penalty. The letter written by Amazon to the FAA suggests a
strong point about commercial drone operators as a whole, versus cas-
ual model aircraft operators, stating that:
[G]ranting this request will do nothing more than allow Amazon to
do what thousands of hobbyists and manufacturers of model aircraft
do every day, and we will abide by much stronger safety measures
than currently required for these groups by FAA policies and regula-
tions. In this petition for exemption, we seek to engage in essentially
the same type of small UAS operation that the FAA would permit
us to currently–but for the fact that Amazon is not a hobbyist or
manufacturer of a model aircraft. (emphasis added).142
In essence, the letter points to the elephant in the room, assuming
commercial drone operators are or will be subject to any regulatory
authority of the FAA. Recreational drone operators may fly in any
manner they so choose, so long as they are not reckless or careless as
mandated by Part 91. Because the Advisory Circular is, and has al-
ways been, voluntary, model aircraft operators are not bound to oper-
ate under the suggested 400-foot ceiling, call nearby airports, or even
assure that their model aircraft is airworthy. Essentially a recreational
operator, with no profit motive, may operate his or her drone without
regard for any rules so long as they do not pose a threat of harm to
others. However, commercial operators, like Lakemaid Beer Delivery
and Pirker, who have very specific rules and limits on operation, are
unable to take to the air solely because there is an exchange of money
for a delivery service. Lakemaid and Pirker have a profit motive, and
are bound by threats of liability that could affect their bottom lines.
Lakemaid was in the midst of a well-developed testing plan, ensur-
ing that there were no safety issues or a chance for the loss of product
or drone, which are both major liability issues. Lakemaid completed
short-range testing, and sought delivery to distances not to exceed a
half-mile. Further, the business operated in a remote area over a fro-
zen lake, never exceeding the voluntary 400-foot altitude suggested
for the often more hazardous recreational operations. Lakemaid
stands as a shining example of the conditions under which commercial
drone operators can, should, and do operate.
142. Paul Misener, Amazon Petition for Exemption, AMAZON (July 9, 2014), http://
g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/01/rowland/AmazonPetitionforExemption_July9
2014.pdf.
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Now, to say that UAS are entirely safe would be an overstatement.
The technology is not yet perfected, and amateurs often operate UAS
with little to no training. In January 2015, a man accidentally landed
his drone inside the grounds of the White House after he apparently
lost control of the device.143 Both operator and drone manufacturer
pointed fingers for the malfunction, related to the man’s drinking and
failure to follow drone safety feature protocol and to a possible major
glitch in the drone software for when control is lost.144 Regardless of
the cause, the incident highlights that major accidents can and do hap-
pen with drone use.
Moreover, accidents resulting in injuries have occurred. During
Fourth of July celebrations in Key West, Florida, a drone was record-
ing a video of the fireworks.145 As the show ended, the drone lost
control and careened towards a crowd of spectators on private prop-
erty.146 The rotors on the drone ended up cutting a man, and police
were called to the scene.147 These incidents beg the question, what
regulations will allow small commercial UAS to safely occupy the sky
without threatening those airborne with them as well as those on the
ground?
A. FAA Policy Suggestions for Small Commercial UAS Short-term
In the short term, UAS cannot operate in a regulatory void where
operators are unsure what limits they should not exceed, and what
administrative hurdles they must move past in order to operate safely
in the skies. However, subjecting drone operators to the strict rules
required for commercial aircraft operators is also highly unreasonable.
The cost alone to meet such a standard may exceed the cost of a drone
by a factor of eight. With the FAA stating that the regulations coming
with the September 2015 deadline will only be minimal, there must be
another step that will at least allow small regional commercial drone
operators, like Lakemaid, to operate their businesses without fear of
repercussion from the FAA.
As a basis for a short-term fix, the FAA need not look any further
than Advisory Circular 91-57; its voluntary policy has governed model
aircraft use for nearly twenty years. With a few small tweaks and addi-
tions, the FAA could effectively govern small UAS use, make the pol-
icy mandatory through the proper regulatory channels, and allow
more small-scale UAS into the skies for business uses. As a further
143. Micheal D. Shear, Man Lost Contact With Drone Before It Sped to White
House, Friend Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/
us/man-lost-contact-with-drone-before-it-sped-to-white-house-friend-says.html?_r=0.
144. Id.
145. Ricky Boettger, Drone Crash at Fourth of July Fireworks, KONK LIFE (July 29,
2014), http://konknet.com/konk-life/columns/the-big-story/2014-07-29-11.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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benefit, the circular need not address the penalties for when UAS fail
to operate properly, as the operators are now subject to the require-
ments of 14 C.F.R. 91, which states they must not operate their air-
craft in a reckless and dangerous manner. By immediately instituting
the manner in which these UAS may operate, the FAA will have es-
sentially created a “per se” negligence standard that all small commer-
cial drone operators must follow, with the real possibility of a $10,000
penalty in failing to do so.
The Author suggests the following policy changes for immediate im-
plementation: First, the new policy must recognize the hybrid nature
of commercial UAS as neither civil nor model aircraft. These “com-
mercial small UAS” are particularly unique, as they do not operate
with the power or abilities of even the smallest civil aircraft while ar-
guably operating under stricter limits than a model aircraft operator
would. Moreover, because this new class of craft is commercial in na-
ture, it falls outside the FAA’s ban to regulate model aircraft pursuant
to Section 336 of the FAARMA.
Second, in order to properly define what UAS qualify as commer-
cial small UAS, the FAA should consider a slightly modified version
of the model aircraft definition. The hobby or recreational use ele-
ment should be discarded. However, the 55-pound limit should be re-
tained as an absolute upward size limit with no ability to obtain a
community-based design waiver. Model aircraft are also required to
operate in accordance with community-based safety guidelines and
within the program of a national hobbyist organization. Again, it is
likely this requirement will not translate well to a commercial UAS.
Instead, the FAA may consider a relatively short and cheap training
package administered online. This would allow a uniform standard of
operation across the United States. Additionally, it would encourage
small commercial operators to avoid operating in a reckless manner
that will put them in a position like Pirker. Notice of this requirement
should be required within every drone purchase as part of the infor-
mational packet. Another addition to the rules may also concern an
insurance or bond requirement, offered publicly through the FAA or
privately.
Third, as far as actual operating standards go, the FAA should take
a page from Advisory Circular 91-57. Keeping in mind that commer-
cial operators stand to lose far more than a modeler, it stands to rea-
son that the safety standards suggested for modelers in Section 3,
including the 400-foot altitude limit, giving way to full scale aircraft,
and giving proper notice to control towers when flying in proximity to
airfields, would be adequately safe. The FAA may seek to add further
requirements in light of the new technologies, requiring that UAS do
not go further than one mile from the operator in rural areas, and
maintaining constant line of sight within city limits. The FAA does not
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR306.txt unknown Seq: 19  4-DEC-15 10:46
2015] DRONE NATION 529
currently recognize remotely streaming video from a drone to the con-
troller as meeting the line of sight standard.
Fourth, and most importantly, the new regulations must unequivo-
cally bind a very distinct subset of commercial UAS users to these
specific rules. Because the FAA now considers any object that enters
the air an aircraft, even model aircraft are subject to general FARs
relating to reckless operations for all aircraft. However, because the
FAA does not see commercial UAS as model aircraft, and subjecting
them to the stringent requirements of other civil aircraft would be ab-
surd, the FAA must hold these UAS to an alternate standard as a
matter of law. By outlining the specific UAS that qualify for these
regulations, the FAA would remove the ambiguity under which com-
mercial UAS currently operate without adding unnecessary adminis-
trative burdens for larger and more powerful UAS and civil aircraft
alike.
B. Proposed FAA Rules and Suggestions
As an interesting twist during the writing of this Comment, the
FAA surged forward unexpectedly with their drone regulations.148 On
February 15, 2015, the FAA inadvertently released the draft version of
small commercial UAS rules. Rather than backpedal, the FAA de-
cided to release a draft of the proposed rules for public comment.149
The proposed rules consider an exhaustive list of issues relating to
small commercial UAS operation in the NAS. The suggestions fall to
major categories: operational limitations, operator certification and
responsibilities, and aircraft requirements.150 A large part of the pro-
posed rules fall in line with the author’s suggestions, including size,
speed, and range limitations, a general necessity for operator knowl-
edge; and creating a special class of small UAS that may conduct com-
mercial operations in the NAS.151 However, other parts of the
proposed rules do not consider the current trends for small UAS or
create undue burdens for operators.
For example, the rules require the operation of small UAS solely
under Visual Line of Sight (“VLOS”) rules.152 This requires that at all
times the person controlling the craft must be able to visually identify
the aircraft without any aid, corrective lenses excluded.153 The current
148. Gregory McNeal, Leaked FAA Document Provides Glimpse into Drone Regu-
lations, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2015, 3:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/
2015/02/14/the-faa-may-get-drones-right-after-all-9-insights-into-forthcoming-regula
tions/.
149. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9544-01, 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43,
45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, 183).
150. Id. at 9546.
151. Id. at 9546–47.
152. Id. at 9546.
153. Id.
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trend in small UAS, however, allows a user to operate the UAS with a
first-person camera that transmits live video and other data back to
the operator.154 Some of the additional data includes: airspeed, alti-
tude, heading, distance from the operator, and GPS position;155 this is
certainly more information than provided by visual means alone, as
required by the proposed rules.
The current technological aspects of operator control systems could
easily amend such a limitation. The FAA should instead consider per-
mitting operators to fly within a one-mile radius of their position, as
displayed by the control station. In order to operate under such a rule,
the craft should likely require the live video feed and several of the
data points available. As a minimum, velocity, headings, and altitude
should accent a live video feed with enough information for a control-
ler to have a clear picture of the UAS’s position and happenings. In
the alternative, the FAA should consider adding an “instrument rat-
ing” similar to those offered for larger fixed and rotary wing aircraft,
which allows a pilot to fly in conditions where visual reference is
unavailable.
Another example is the need for a small UAS operator to earn a
type rating, through an official FAA testing facility, with a biannual
knowledge test.156 The rules purport to exempt a special “micro” cate-
gory from this requirement by allowing operators to “self-certify” with
the same aeronautical knowledge as would be required for the small
UAS category.157 However, normal small UAS operators are required
to walk a gauntlet of administrative tasks in order to legally operate  a
commercial drone.158 This process is expected to cost somewhere be-
tween $5,700 and $6,800, quite a large expense for any license and not
far from the same cost of obtaining a private pilot’s license to operate
a larger fixed wing aircraft.159 This cost includes an extensive back-
ground check by the Transportation Security Administration, costing
in excess of $1,000.160 As a reminder of the costliness of commercial
UAS operations, note that operators must take a knowledge test every
twenty-four months, which the FAA estimates at a cost of $2,500.161
Taking a step back to consider the situation, this requirement seems
unreasonable. A UAS operator, acting in a non-commercial manner,
would be able to operate the UAV in the NAS cost free, and without
154. DJI Phantom 2 Vision+, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision-
plus/feature (last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
155. Id. (referred to as flight parameters).
156. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9544-01, 9546 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43,
45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, 183).
157. Id.
158. Id. at at 9549–51.
159. Id. at 9578–79.
160. Id. at 9579.
161. Id.
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regulation per the FAAMRA. That same UAS would have no applica-
ble restrictions for altitude, speed, or line of sight. Instead, they are
only limited by rules requiring that they operate in a non-reckless
manner.
That same UAV, under hire for example to photograph an area,
must fly under certain altitude and speed restriction, within a very
close distance, and after spending an amount of money that eclipses
even those most expensive of UAS systems. Such a rule not only dis-
courages those from entering the UAS commercial market, as it is
cost-prohibitive, but also encourages commercial operators to avoid
the long and arduous process when their net proceeds may be signifi-
cantly less.
Instead, the FAA should offer a knowledge base for UAS operators
without the unnecessary testing at an FAA facility, or at such a high
cost. The rules themselves offer significant protection during UAS op-
eration, limiting several aspects of the operation; far more than a rec-
reational UAS operator must endure.
As a summary, the operational limitations seem mostly sound, if not
behind current technology a bit. But the administrative burdens seem
excessive, and may even discourage the growth of commercial UAS
operators by the sheer magnitude of the cost relative to gain.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the FAA is heading in the right direction by remov-
ing the effective ban on commercial UAS operations in the NAS. Un-
manned flying machines have a long, rich history for many purposes
and show even greater promise going forward. However, to encourage
this promise the FAA must not overly burden commerce related to
their use with excessive or unnecessary administrative costs and limi-
tations. Instead, operational limitations on the UAS themselves are
their strongest tool to ensure that small operators, like Lakemaid
Beer, operate in a safe manner that poses no risk to the NAS or na-
tional security. By following the policy as suggested in this Comment,
the FAA can ensure a safe, yet prosperous UAS market that allows
ice fisherman (among others) to safely receive their beer by UAS.
What could be better?
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